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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Caste is ever-controversial, whether as a kind of identity, a social system, or the
basis of discrimination. For nearly a century, scholars of caste have been caught
in the crossfire of the politics of decolonization and of Dalit emancipation. Two
Indian intellectuals stand out as having used anthropology and progressive law/
policy to shape modern knowledge on caste, knowledge that today is chal-
lenged by reactionary political deployment of postcolonial deconstructions of
caste. The year 2016 marked the one hundredth birth anniversary of Professor
M. N. Srinivas, who is celebrated as the man who founded and institutionalized
Indian social anthropology as a fieldwork-based, comparative, and generalizing
social science in its postcolonial form. It also marked the 125th birth anniver-
sary of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, a man who, more than any Indian national leader,
mobilized a social and political, institutional, and legal response to social exclu-
sion and injustice and put in place constitutional safeguards.
The lives of these two men are contrasting in some respects—the one was
Brahmin and the other Dalit by caste, but they also mirror and parallel each
other. Both exercised a kind of reverse anthropology, traveling to another
society, the United States and England, respectively, in order deeply to
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immerse themselves in the culture, thought, and values of that society, grasping
its essentials and seeing its flaws, and returned home seeking to know the work-
ings of their own society beyond the metropolis, the middle-class, and the
“book view” (Srinivas 1976: 164; Vajpeyi 2014). Both men lost their books,
notes, and papers—Ambedkar to a German torpedo and Srinivas to a Stanford
arsonist—but through lived experience discovered caste as the key mediator of
human relations in India. In Rampura village, Srinivas discovered that he could
not be other than a Brahman, and more significantly, Ambedkar back in India
experienced painfully that despite every imaginable qualification he could not
be other than an untouchable (Srinivas 1976: 164; Vajpeyi 2014).
Their imperatives were of course different. Ambedkar took his own humil-
iation as indicative of a social system whose “mechanisms, genesis and devel-
opment,” whose underlying beliefs and effects on millions of Dalits (members
of castes subordinated as “untouchable”) had to be understood in order to be
challenged (Ambedkar 1979). Srinivas placed his emphasis on social scientific
knowledge itself, on truthful observation and description of social patterns,
functions, and change, through his roles as a mentor, institution builder, and,
perhaps reluctantly, public intellectual. As Veena Das remarks, Srinivas was
of the generation that “had to forge the idea of social science under the sign
of the [independent] nation” (2000). This meant freeing anthropology from
two things: its heritage as part of the colonial enterprise,1 and its nationalist
self-representation derived from a textual view of Indian civilization (ibid.).
Radcliff-Brown’s structural functionalism and the practice of rigorous field-
work served both purposes. As Srinivas demonstrated in his famous idea of
“Sanskritization” (1995: 15–41), civilizational debate would be relocated
within observed social processes such as competitive social mobility.
This article is about more recent reactions and political and policy chal-
lenges that work against both Ambedkar’s drive to reveal caste as a fundamen-
tal fact of history and power, with harms countered through law and social
policy, and Srinivas’s idea of a postcolonial social anthropology of caste.
While in the new transnational politics of caste Dalit organizations find recog-
nition in the anthropology of caste and in legal protections with international
scope, Hindu organizations have mounted political and epistemological
challenges. On one hand, they have “enclosed” caste within religion and the
nation, specifically Hinduism and India, so as to restrict the field of social
policy and exempt caste from the law as a basis of discrimination. On the
other, they have attempted rhetorically to re-embed social anthropology in its
colonial past so as to dismiss “caste” as a category of description and social
analysis. To make my points, I will employ the paired cases of caste among
non-Hindus and caste outside India. In both, there is sufficient social-scientific
1 See Fuller (2016b; 2016a) for a reappraisal of this heritage.
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evidence that caste and its un-equalizing effects exist, and yet there is marked
resistance to public recognition of this fact in social policy and law.
The first case is the Indian policy approach to Christian and Muslim Dalits
and the denial to them of state provisions and protections as Scheduled Castes
(historical victims of oppression and untouchability). The second is resistance
by Hindu organizations to the implementation of legislation outlawing caste-
based discrimination in the UK. Both cases show how, in an influential dis-
course, caste is enclosed within religion and internalized to Hinduism and
the Indian nation. The intent is to both delimit legal and public action on
caste and to discredit anthropological description. These examples will tell
us something about caste as an aspect of “the postcolonial character of
India’s contemporary predicament,” as Dirks (2001: 294) put it, and its dia-
sporic manifestation, in the sense of an echoing tension between the liberal cri-
tique of traditional oppression and the nationalist critique of colonial intrusion.
This tension produces competing frameworks of analysis that, as I will show,
are today being folded in new ways into the strategies of social actors in
fields of political contention.
These claims to castelessness—the denial of caste to non-Hindus in India,
and the denial of the idea of caste by Hindu groups in the UK—will comprise the
first two parts of this article. In the third and final part I will turn to other claims to
castelessness in India today, first by the privileged who invest in the idea of a
casteless world of middle-class merit, and second by Dalits in an area of my
own fieldwork, who respond to being inescapably marked by caste with a differ-
ent idea of life outside of caste. I turn first to the question of caste and non-Hindus
in India, with the proviso that in all that follows what goes under the label “caste”
must be unearthed in each historical and social context.
C A S T E E N C L O S E D W I T H I N H I N D U I S M
In March 2015, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of India decidedly
opposed the demand for Christian and Muslim Dalits to have the status of Sched-
uled Castes (alongside Hindu Dalits), with all the state welfare measures and legal
protections that this status entails. In doing so, it underscored the views, first, that
“‘untouchability’ is a peculiar aspect of Hindu religion that ‘denied to disadvan-
taged castes the fundamentals of human dignity…’” (Ghildiyal 2015) and,
second, that religious conversion (or rather specifically conversion to Christianity
or Islam) changes the social identity of Dalits so as to free them from caste.
Leaving aside the subsequent exceptions granted to Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains
as Indic religionists, this simply restated the position of the Presidential Order
of 1950, which determined that “no person who professes a religion different
from Hinduism shall be deemed to be a member of the Scheduled Castes.”2
2 The list, or “schedule” of the Indian Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1950 was itself
substantially based on that drawn up by Census Commissioner (and anthropologist) J. H. Hutton for
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In the case of Dalit Christians, for the past fifty years church leaders and
activists have objected to this as unconstitutional religious discrimination. They
have done so on the unhappy but certain grounds that it can “be shown that
[Dalits] suffer from a comparable depth of social and economic disabilities
and cultural and educational backwardness and similar levels of degradation
within the Christian community necessitating intervention of the State under
the provisions of the Constitution.” This quotes what the Supreme Court
stated had to be proven to win a case, when ruling on a 1985 writ petition relat-
ing to a Christian cobbler in Chennai, Soosai, who was denied access to a
central government scheme providing sidewalk work stations to Scheduled
Castes.3
Indeed, the expansive Ranganath Misra Commission, which in 2009
reported the established fact of continuing discrimination against Dalit Chris-
tians and Muslims, concluded, “The caste system should be recognised as a
general social characteristic of… Indian society as a whole, without question-
ing whether the philosophy and teachings of any particular religion recognize it
or not” (Ministry of Minority Affairs 2009: 153–54). Its recommendation that
Christians andMuslims of equivalent caste should be included in the Scheduled
Caste list is the one the BJP government decidedly rejected in 2015.
The government here presumed that religious identity determines other
identities, especially caste, and took as real the separate “imagined community”
of Christians which the churches claimed but as a matter of historical fact had
failed to produce (see Mosse 2012). This left Dalits who are Christian with the
dilemma that, while in social reality dominant-caste others block them (espe-
cially in villages) from asserting themselves as people other than as defined
by their birth and lineage—that is, as “untouchables”—the state allows them
to be nothing but Christian (Krishnan 2011), thereby disqualifying them
from statutory welfare and protection. The state requires that caste be an
aspect of religious identity and practice and precludes recognition of caste in
Ambedkar or Srinivas’s terms, as the underlying system of social (and
economic) organization.
When the Indian state privileges religion over caste, we are not dealing
with a simple case of governing religious diversity, and the category
“Hindu” that admits caste identities is not a straightforward religious identity
alongside others. “Hindu” is a default identity that includes all those not
the British government’s equivalent order of 1936, and likewise restricted to Hindus and treating
caste disadvantage as ritual pollution (see also Waughray 2010). The schedule is available at:
http://socialjustice.nic.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/CONSTITUTION%20(SC)%20ORDER%
201950%20dated%2010081950.pdf (accessed 10 July 2018).
3 Soosai v. Union of India 1985, S.C C. supplement 590, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1724190/
(accessed 10 June 2018). The arguments in this article on religion, Christianity, and caste in India
draw on my fuller treatment of them elsewhere (Mosse 2012; 2018b).
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specifically affiliated to religions such as Christianity and Islam. Certainly,
demarcating the Scheduled Castes draws distinctions between those religions
that are “internal” to the national society and caste (Hinduism, Buddhism,
Sikhism, Jainism) and those which are “external” (Christianity and Islam).
Christians and Muslims are not simply adherents to separate religions (as Bud-
dhists or Sikhs might also be) but are distinctively removed from the matrix of
Indian society, which is essentially Hindu. The implication that national society
is Hindu is explicit in the political ideology if Hindutva (Tejani 2008).
There are several implications, as Nathaniel Roberts argues (2016). First,
since in a “pervasive elite consensus” being Hindu is a kind of divinely man-
dated ethnic heritage, one cannot speak of conversion to Hinduism. The “Hin-
duization” of Dalits or Adivasis is rather a matter of reintegration into the
nation, construed by Hindu nationalists as ghar wapsi, or “homecoming.”
Second, because Hindu religion is foundational to social life, then as a
matter of normative assumption rather than empirical fact conversion to
Islam or Christianity (especially by Dalits) is taken to rupture relations and
alienate people. It is seen as potential threat to public order and subject to exter-
nal manipulation and force, and as such as requiring regulation by law. Anti-
conversion legislation was enacted in seven Indian states between 1967 and
2006. These laws scrutinize the authenticity of belief and the spiritual and
material motivations of Dalits presumed incapable of “genuine conversion,”
in a manner that is entirely inapplicable to programs of Hinduization (ibid.:
114, et seq).
Contrary to the discourse that encloses caste within Hinduism, my ethno-
graphic and historical research over the past thirty years in Hindu and Christian
rural Tamil Nadu convinces me that, there, caste has never been understood as
Hindu (Mosse 2012). Which gods people worship and in what manner, the
powers they believe determine good or ill fortune, and the affiliation to
gurus, priests, or pastors are not at all fundamental to indentities of caste, or
even to cultural values, as is widely presumed. This presumption is found
not just in Hindu nationalist thought, Roberts points out, but also in the
modern Western social science idea of religion as culture, value, and identity,
upon which this Hindu nationalist thought rests (2016: 118–19). Christianity
in the Tamil countryside, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Pentecostal, has
never (even now, despite engagement in increasingly global forms) constituted
a cultural boundary separating its adherents from Indian caste society. Dalit
Christian activism, mass rebellion in the churches or exodus to less hierarchical
Pentecostalism or Islam, and the rise of Dalit theology are all testament to a
caste dynamic in Indian Christianity (Mosse 2012).
The question is, how did caste come to be enclosed in Hindu religion and
with what effects? The answer, we discover, is bound up historically with the
question of the religious identity of Dalits. Specifically, the idea that those who
convert to Islam or Christianity are “leaving the fold” and weakening the ties of
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the nation rests on the supposed prior common identity of Dalits as Hindus.
However, the “Hinduization” of Dalits has come to be regarded as an histori-
cally contingent outcome of distinct but interdependent processes of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, driven by the struggles and political
assertions of subjugated Dalits intersecting with discourses and exigencies of
Protestant missionaries, the British administration, and, later, nationalists.
These interactions reconfigured religion and caste into their modern relationship.
In her book The Pariah Problem (2014), Rupa Viswanath shows that
before the late nineteenth century, in South India the idea that caste Hindus
and “Pariahs” (as Dalits were known) shared religion was hardly accepted.
“It was,” she writes, “common for Pariahs to address caste folk as Hindus, a
term used in contradistinction to themselves” (ibid.: 134). Well into the twen-
tieth century, the term “Hindu” applied to “upper” castes of any religion. So,
when in 1936 upper-caste Catholics in Thiruchirappalli (Tamilnadu) appealed
to the colonial authorities against the bishop’s decision to allow Dalits access to
the main church building for mass, they did so as Hindus. They argued that it
would contravene their established custom as “Hindu Christians of caste” if
they were forced to sit next to a body of Adi Dravidas (Dalits) “composed
solely of scavengers and cobblers and flayers.”4
Viswanath (2014) gives historical depth to what is clear in the ethno-
graphic record, namely that Dalits were an excluded section of society
subject to enforced landlessness and agrestic servitude/slavery. They were a
constitutive “outside,” so that the spaces of society that counted as the
village (the Tamil ūr), the public/common, or the Hindu presumed the exclu-
sion of Dalits. And the public rituals of temple, tank, or village enacted Dalit
exclusion or subordination, further articulated in ideologies of impurity and
untouchability (Mosse 2012). Prior to the Hinduization of the Dalit plight,
no caste person was in the least concerned about their religion, if indeed
they were regarded as capable of religion at all (Roberts 2016: 145–46).
Roberts points out that when British census takers used mutually exclusive reli-
gious categories (Hindu, Muslim, and so on) to sort these people, they departed
from the more usual practice of distinguishing “clean” from servile castes
(regardless of forms of worship), or Hindus from untouchables, such that late
nineteenth-century native census workers had to be persuaded to record
those barred from temple entry—the Dalits—as Hindus. (In significant con-
trast, the Brahmin census takers whom Joel Lee accompanied in his ethnogra-
phy of the 2011 Census, recorded Dalits as Hindu “even when they themselves
told him they were not” (Lee 2015: 3–5, cited in Roberts 2016: 127).5
4 Report of the trial “Plaint of a Parishioner against the Bishop,” July 1936, Tiruchirappalli.
Jesuit Archives, Vanves, France (cited in Manickam 2001: 366).
5 This glosses over the debate among British officials, not just on whether the Untouchable
Scheduled Castes could or could not be considered Hindu by default, but also on related
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Moreover, the mass adoption of Christianity among Dalits across South
India from the 1870s is not properly understood as a movement of religious
conversion in the sense of leaving the Hindu fold, but rather, Viswanath
(2014) argues, as the forming of a “Pariah-missionary alliance” in the
context of antagonistic relationships between enslaved laborers and landlords.
This was mostly initiated by the Dalits rather than the missionaries, who were
themselves just as disconcerted to be solicited by groups they had largely over-
looked as to be overlooked by the elite groups they had sought to influence. In
fact, for the most part missionaries of all denominations were conservative and
sought, as one put it, to “raise [the Pariah] in his social state, not out of it.”6
Historical research shows that Dalits were drawn to missionaries and the Chris-
tianity they preached for complex, overlapping material, social, moral, and spir-
itual reasons (e.g., Mohan 2015) and because the colonial government offered
little protection from abuse. The government held a view of rural servitude as a
benign moral economy (anthropologically reinvented as the jajmani system),
maintaining a self-interested denial of the existence of slavery in the native
labor regimes upon which both rule and revenue rested (Viswanath 2014). Prot-
estant missionaries, on the other hand, intervened against relations of slavery,
for example by enabling Dalit freedom from debt bondage, their acquisition
of house sites, or their resettlement on agricultural “wasteland.” But, Viswanath
(2014) convincingly argues, in order to avoid the accusation from both home
supporters and critics that their converts were materially motivated “rice Chris-
tians,” they construed such evidently political-economic change as spiritual
transformation, and Dalits as victims of “spiritual slavery” within a Hindu reli-
gious system. This even though the distinction between the material and the
spiritual would have meant little to Dalits themselves.7
matters, such as what sort of a phenomenon caste was, or was perceived to be by people themselves
(and it might be several, to do with religion or occupation, varna, title, rank or race, system or
value); how distinct identities—caste, sub-caste, clan, tribe—could be tabulated; and whether the
Scheduled Castes could be considered a distinct category in pan-Indian society and, if so, by
what criteria or test. Colonial anthropology failed to resolve the latter question, bequeathing diver-
sity to the “schedules” drawn up in 1936 (Fuller 2016b). However, these caste and religious cate-
gories were rendered simplified and self-enforcing by the exigencies of competitive
representational politics, with proposed separate Hindu, Muslim, and Scheduled Caste elector-
ates/reserved seats. “Untouchability” was narrowed to religious matters of temple exclusion and
pollution—or in Ambedkar’s terms the “social odium” suffered on account of Hindu dogma—
defining the Depressed Classes or Scheduled Castes (ibid.), who subsequently became an increas-
ingly identifiable and self-aware social and political category.
6 Rev. J. M., “Our Native Christians,” Harvest Field (1863–1864): 203, cited in Viswanath
(2013: 132).
7 The nature of late nineteenth-century Dalit “conversions” is a matter of unresolved historical
debate. My intention here is not to emphasize the material over the moral or the spiritual. Both being
drivers for economic freedom and human dignity, missionary-directed religious or lifestyle changes
and Dalit social-spiritual aspirations intersected. Christianity entered Dalit struggles against a form
of enslavement that was inseparably material and religious, and experienced in a world that did not
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The missionary logic that rendered caste and Dalit oppression a matter of
spirit and religion then acquired further significance. In 1859, the British
adopted a governing principle of non-interference in matters understood as
“native religion,” which administrators increasingly took to include caste.
This also gave landlords a new language with which to resist and object to mis-
sionary interventions on behalf of their dependent laborers, namely that by
doing so they were interfering in customary and religious practice. This was
solidified in the courts through which, in effect, landlords obtained from the
state a religious right to dominate and exclude Dalits (ibid.), whose claims
were consequently invalidated. As Viswanath sums it up, “Religion emerged
as the favored language of contestation” (2014: 143) and the judgement on mis-
sionaries shifted: once branded a threat to caste privilege because they abetted
Dalit insubordination, they were now said to menace the Hindu religion and its
social system because they contrived inauthentic conversions (2014: 163–67).8
However, this narrative of the threat of religious conversion only gained
force nationally (beyond local conflicts) starting in the 1930s, again in response
to Dalit assertions, but now in the context of the representative Legislative
Councils (another tactic of British governance) and the new politics of identity
demographics. Roberts (2016) places M. K. Gandhi at the very center of a
project to incorporate Dalits as Hindu. This was aimed significantly as a
defense against Dr Ambedkar’s movement identifying Untouchables or
Depressed Classes as a separate element in the nation—a recognized
minority—with separate interests and constituting a separate electorate on
the basis of their caste and economic oppression; that is, as those treated as out-
siders and without natural alignment to the upper-caste Hindu nationalist lead-
ership. Paradoxically, Gandhi sought to claim Dalits as Hindu by making ritual
untouchability definitive of Dalits and as a distinctively Hindu form of humil-
iation. This effectively replaced the unfree labor and socio-economic oppres-
sion of Dalits with theories of pollution, and Ambedkar’s political
empowerment and land reform with symbolic remedies.
Ambedkar was himself clear that the oppression of caste could not be
treated as a religious matter separate from society and economy. It is well
known how critical he was of the Hindu scriptural sanction of caste and
varna, but he rejected the idea that untouchability was only a cultural or reli-
gious matter. He was offended when the British colonial government refused
to address what were clearly civic disabilities, such as Dalit children being
yet draw the modern distinction that missionaries deployed between the “religious” and the
“secular” (see Mosse 2012).
8 In parallel, 1901 Census Commissioner Herbert Risley underlined a view of caste as social/
ritual precedence, rather than hereditary occupation, using Brahmanical criteria, and thus “as dis-
tinctly, or even uniquely, Hindu-cum-Indian” (Fuller 2016a: 235).
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refused entry to schools on the grounds that the government could not intervene
in matters of cultural or religious tradition. He proclaimed that Dalits held civic
rights and the universal right to equal treatment and so he was equally offended
by the Hindu reformers who felt that welfare work for Dalits was, as Gandhi put
it, “a penance which the Hindus have to do for the sin of Untouchability”
(Rodrigues 2002: 351–68).
Making Hindu reform the sole means of recovery of selfhood and identity,
as Gandhi proposed, involved two internalizing effects. First, as noted, Dalits
would be integrated into the nation by defining them first and foremost by
their ritual impurity—their untouchability—which was a condition specific
and internal to Hinduism. Second, this in turn made other remedies, including
the social actions of missionaries, illegitimate intrusions into the internal affairs
of the person and of Hinduism (Roberts 2016: 7, 143).
From this historical moment, Roberts argues, arose the currently pervasive
(Indian and diaspora) elite consensus on caste, nation, and religious conversion.
Conversion is interpreted as a form of self-alienation and betrayal of one’s
ancestors, and the religious affiliation and the souls of Dalits endure as
matters of national concern. But equally, because of this nationalist discourse,
conversion itself has acquired the novel capacity to symbolize culpable
alienation by the state, and thus it can be used as a political strategy, as in
the well-known Dalit mass conversions to Islam in the southern Tamil
village of Meenakshipuram in 1981 (Mosse 2012: 191–93).
In sum, the conditions of British colonial rule, missionary practice, and
Indian nationalist discourse together produce a powerful policy-framing of
caste as exclusively Hindu (and Indian) that is quite at odds with empirical
evidence. This has shaped the politics of conversion and the policy on Sched-
uled Castes defined by historical disabilities of Hinduism in a manner that mar-
ginalizes attention to caste as a continuing structural cause of poverty,
inequality, and discrimination, and places caste outside the purview of the
mainstream economic and development planning of the secular state.9 I have
discussed these themes elsewhere (Mosse 2018a; n.d.). What I turn to now is
9 One of my reviewers felt the argument on the elite historical construction of caste as religious
and Hindu overlooked the centuries-long, and contemporary, Dalit critique of Brahmanic/Hindu
caste ideology and exclusion. A clarification is required. Through a variety of philosophical/theo-
logical traditions, collective actions, and movements, Dalits have indeed raised voices against the
ritual subordinations, humiliations, and exclusions of Hindu temples, sects, or priestly services that
served to define enslaved Dalits as a polluting exterior. On these grounds, several Dalit leaders,
including Ambedkar, rejected Hinduism and asserted their essentially non-Hindu identity; even
though, as contemporary Dalit writer Raj Gauthaman maintains, Dalit protest culture must be
forged through the medium of the Hinduism it opposes, and from which it draws its weapons
(2011: 157). Such leaders did not, however, consider themselves exploited as Hindus, but rather
as excluded “untouchables.” This is different from, and in fact the reverse of, the modern Hindu
nationalist incorporation of Dalits as Hindus with debilities defined and remedied in religious/cul-
tural terms, which denies them legitimate political-economic claims or recourse to alternative non-
Hindu identities, including Christian ones.
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a parallel effort to enclose caste within Hinduism, also in response to Ambed-
karite Dalit mobilization against caste discrimination, but this time outside of
India, in the UK.
C A S T E I N B R I TA I N
It is well known that when they leave India and live in countries like the UK,
Dalits cannot simply shed their caste identification any more than they leave
Hinduism in India, even though caste takes different and varied forms when
it is recontextualized in the UK and is partly articulated through separate reli-
gious affiliations, such as Ravidassia or Valmiki.10 Caste prejudice, sometimes
in the form of discrimination in employment, business, rental markets, or ser-
vices (e.g., refusal of taxi rides), bullying in schools, and the demeaning use of
caste names have all been documented in independent academic and UK
government-commissioned research.11 Cases of discrimination are also
reported in health services and social care, such as when a social services care-
worker, having seen a picture of Guru Ravidass in the bedroom of an elderly
Punjabi woman, refused to help bathe her (Metcalf and Rolfe 2010: 49, 74).
Modern British-Asian youth music and culture has not been free from dominant
caste pride.12
As with non-Hindus in India, in the UK there is no means to recognize and
redress caste-based discrimination. This prompted a decade-long campaign for
changes in the law, which drew together streams of activism led by Ambedkar-
ite, Buddhist, Ravidassia, Valmiki, and other Dalit diaspora organizations.
These included the UK Dalit Solidarity Network, the umbrella International
Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN), and India-based groups, especially the
National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR). They also received
support from Labour and Liberal Lords and MPs, including Jeremy Corbyn
10 Caste has diverse manifestations over time and context, so no assumptions are made here
about the similarity of the experiences of those attributed, or claiming, caste identities equivalent
to Dalit in rural/urban India and the UK. Readers are referred to a growing literature on caste asso-
ciations ( jati and allied grouping such as biradiri, zat) within different diaspora communities in the
UK, and on attitudes toward caste as a matter of marriage, social belonging, family heritage, and
ritual-religious assembly. For recent mapping and citations of this body of work in general, and sep-
arately in relation to UK Punjabis, Gujaratis, Sri Lankan Tamils and Nepalis, Sikhs and Hindus, see
Dhanda, Waughray, et al. 2014; Takhar 2017; Dhanda 2017; Paramsothy 2018; Pariyar 2011; Ver-
tovec 2000; Patel and Dhaliwal 2016; Nesbitt 1997; and Dhanda, Mosse, et al. 2014. Also, I do not
intend the different approaches to caste in the Indian and UK legal systems to be discounted (see
Waughray n.d.).
11 Studies focused on forms of caste pride or discrimination in different settings—regional,
generational, and in fields covered by equality law—include: Anti-Caste Discrimination Alliance
2009; Dhanda 2015; 2017; Ghuman 2011; Metcalf and Rolfe 2010. Attitudes toward caste are
nuanced and situation-specific, and vary by age and socio-religious, class, and caste identities.
They are, moreover, shaped by the controversy over caste legislation itself. See discussion of the
case of British Sikhs and Punjabi Dalits in Takhar 2017.
12 An example would be bhangra lyrics such as those that strengthen positive identification with
Punjabi Jat (upper-caste) identity among Sikh youth (Takhar 2017, citing Mooney 2011: 311).
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(Waughray 2014).13 These campaigners brought the issue to the attention of
Parliament which, to the surprise of many, voted to make caste-based discrim-
ination illegal in the areas of work, education, and the supply of goods and ser-
vices covered under equality law.
Thus was the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, passed in April
2013. Section 97 of the Act requires government to introduce a statutory pro-
hibition of caste discrimination into British equality law by making caste “an
aspect of” the protected characteristic of race in the Equality Act of 2010. In
light of this, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) contracted
a team of researchers, of which I was one (along with Annapurna Waughray
and Meena Dhanda, who led), to help develop secondary legislation: (a) by
undertaking socio-legal research on British equality law and caste to identify
issues of principle, legal definition, exception, and public sector duty relevant
to the implementation of this law (Dhanda, Waughray, et al. 2014); and (b) by
conducting expert and stakeholder workshops to identify the range of experi-
ences and opinions relevant to implementation (Dhanda, Mosse, et al. 2014).
These studies took place in late 2013.
Nevertheless, the scheduled formal consultation on implementation of the
law that was supposed to follow did not take place. The legislation remained
unimplemented by the Conservative government, which Hindu organizations
strongly lobbied for its repeal. In July 2018, the government responded to a
public consultation, not on implementation but on whether legislative change
is needed at all, or whether instead case law can be relied upon to protect
against caste discrimination, taken as an aspect of ethnic identity under existing
equality law.14 In its response, the government tabulated and interpreted the
over sixteen thousand submitted statements (many of them identical “batch”
responses) as grounds on which to reject the introduction of caste as an
aspect of race in the Equality Act and to repeal the established duty to do so
(Government Equality Office 2018).
Many aspects and factors in this stalled legislative process are of interest,
but I am concerned here with just one crucial one, namely the public response
of Hindu organizations to the proposed legislation, because I see it as a parallel
case of the enclosure of caste within religion. In brief, a position strongly
opposing new legislation was taken by Hindu organizations, including the Alli-
ance of Hindu Organizations, Hindu Forum of Britain, Hindu Council UK, the
National Council of Hindu Temples (NCHT), the Hindu Lawyers’ Association,
13 The mobilization against discrimination by these Dalit diaspora and Dalit rights organizations
is a separate subject of research (see Waughray n.d.).
14 The instance that alerted the government to this possibility was an Employment Appeal Tri-
bunal in September of 2015 (Tirkey v Chandhok), which ruled in favor of a claim against abusive
and discriminatory treatment of an Indian-national domestic worker in the UK, who identified as
“Christian Adivasi” or “tribal,” on the grounds of her ethnic origins, “including her perceived
status in the caste system” (Waughray and Dhanda 2016: 186).
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and the National Council of Hindu Priests. I will refer here to their published or
publicly stated views, and those of certain individuals, in short hand, as the
“Hindu position.” This position held, first, that legislation is unnecessary
because caste discrimination does not exist, and second that legislation and
public debate on caste produces prejudice against the Hindu religious minority
in Britain.15
I will not discuss here the claim that caste discrimination does not exist
(see notes 10 and 11). Suffice it to say that at the stakeholder workshop we
organized, this was not a claim that could be sustained face-to-face with
Dalits reporting their personal experience. As an instance of the second
claim, on anti-Hindu prejudice, on 20 March 2014 the Alliance of Hindu Orga-
nizations (AHO) wrote to the Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on
British Hindus to call the EHRC report (which itself rejected the idea of
caste as inherently religious or Hindu) “overtly prejudiced against the British
Hindu community,” and charge that it was publicly funded research carried
out “at the expense of the reputation and harmony of the British Hindu commu-
nity.” Beyond this, the letter claimed that “caste” itself is a “negatively charged
and inherently racist word,” and its use in British legislation “an act of anti-
Hindu racial and religious violence and prejudice of the highest order.”16
This present-day discursive enclosure of caste within Hinduism in the
trope of “Hindu hurt,” I will suggest, occurs in two distinct moves that I will
treat in turn. The first is an “externalization” of caste (as a misrepresenting,
“racist” idea) onto specific others. The second is the “internalization” of
caste ( jati) as a uniquely Hindu form of association that outsiders cannot legit-
imately represent or govern.
The Externalization of Caste
How is caste externalized as a racist misrepresentation? UK Hindu organiza-
tions have given their signature to a position that has appeared in a series of
online articles, blogs, and recently a book (Shah 2015) in which Prakash
15 The voices polarized on caste legislation are not drawn from the same diaspora populations.
For example, at the EHRC stakeholder event a majority of pro-legislation, Dalit organizations
(fifteen, or 75 percent) were Punjabi (Dhanda 2017: 62); Hindu organizations opposing caste
were significantly Gujarati. The position of Sikh organizations was more complex, but they strongly
opposed any identification of caste with Sikhism (Dhanda, Waughray, et al. 2014; Takhar 2017).
16 Letter from Vivek Sharma to Rt. Hon. Bob Blackman, Chair APPG for British Hindus on
behalf of the Alliance of Hindu Organisations (AHO), 19 Mar. 2014, Subject: Response to
EHRC Report on Caste Prejudice in the UK, http://www.mycasteishindu.org/index.php/compo-
nent/content/article/20-frontpage/319-aho-briefing-for-appg-20th-march-2014 (accessed 17 July
2015). Consistent with this refusal of the language of caste, 3,588 respondents to the government’s
2017 consultation rejected both legislative change and reliance on case law as protection against
caste discrimination, since caste, and this discrimination, they said, does not exist in the UK.
Some insisted that the word caste should be removed from domestic law, including case law, to
“prevent the possibility of caste being a legal concept in domestic law” (Government Equality
Office 2018: 13).
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Shah (legal academic and co-director of the newly formed Dharmic Ideas
Policy Foundation) states that the proposed UK legislation on caste
discrimination, the public debate, and the concept “caste” itself represents an
orientalist-theological form of knowledge about, or a framework interpreting,
Indian institutions that originated in the twinned purposes of colonial domina-
tion and rule, and the moral denigration of Hinduism by missionaries in the
service of proselytism. The argument was subsequently polemicized in a
report from the National Council for Hindu Temples titled “Caste, Conversion
and a ‘Thoroughly Colonial Conspiracy’” (NCHT-UK 2017), which describes
UK legislation on caste discrimination as a “hate crime against Hindus.”
Unsurprisingly, Shah and the NCHT are not much interested in what
mainstream social science or historical research reveals about caste, or the
various colonial and contemporary forces shaping its modern forms and
effects. Their concern is to explain and discredit the link between caste and
inequality, hierarchy, and discrimination. These alleged links, they argue, are
fabrications produced by the imposition of Western normative ethics onto
Indian cultural ideas—varna, jati, biradiri—that were mistranslated and dero-
gated as “caste” (Shah 2015: 72). In this view, it is not the Dalit experience of
discrimination that motivates the introduction of “caste” into UK equality law.
Instead, “Dalit/untouchable” is portrayed as a false category produced by
Anglican-colonial policies that criminalized certain caste/tribe identities
(NCHT-UK 2017: 17–18).17 It is a persisting (missionary-colonial) cultural
imaginary that vilifies Hindus and unnecessarily exposes them to litigation
under the presumption that they practice caste discrimination. Because it is
bolted to this colonialist moral evaluation, the language of caste, especially if
built into law, is offensive to British Hindus.
In more direct terms, General Secretary, National Council of Hindu
Temples Satish K. Sharma wrote in an open letter in 2015:
For the avoidance of any doubt, we re-iterate that the fluid and equitable, Dharmic, non-
hereditary, non-endogamous, social structures which are repeatedly detailed in Hindu,
Sikh and Jain scriptures, in no way match the Caste system which was created by the
despotic medieval Popes in Europe, then exported by colonial missionaries to the
Empire. It is ironic that this same concept is nowadays so favoured by its philosophical
parents, the Evangelicals, as the “bête noir” with which to globally denigrate the
Dharmic communities … the legislation … is tantamount to religious persecution of
Hindus, Sikhs & Jains and is in breach of the human rights of the minority Dharmic
communities.18
17 Reference here is to the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, by which entire groups of forest dwell-
ers, itinerant traders, or those involved in protection/policing—but not generally those subordinated
as “untouchables”—were classified and regulated as hereditary criminals (Dirks 2001: 181–88).
18 Letter dated 3May 2015, posted on www.nchtuk.org ahead of the UK general election in 2015
appealing to “Dharmic voters” to vote for the Conservatives in favor of repealing caste legislation. It
was subsequently removed from the website.
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In short, those who now constitute themselves as representatives of the UK’s
“Dharmic communities” (a term that embraces Hindu, Jain, and Sikh) regard
“caste” as a mistaken and offensive category of description; individual quali-
ties/attributes or the various types of association or marriage in Hindu
society have been “maliciously transmuted” (NCHT-UK 2017: 23) into the
social-categorical terms of caste, and manifestations of “sex- and love-based
violence” have been misconstrued as caste atrocity. Further, the Hindu position
sees in the proposed legislation the missionary-colonial idea of caste continued
today as a project to regulate and control the Hindu religious minority in the
UK.19
We have moved here from historically based representations of caste as
Hindu to the modern Hindu objection to “caste” as an object at all. A social
science idea of caste is delegitimized as racist and colonial and discourse on
“caste” is enclosed within, or erased by, Hinduism, or the Hindu religious
minority. This occurs through what Simpson (2016: 120) and others have
argued is an intellectual project of the Hindu right to “shift the basis of
ethical judgements, [and] insert the trope of ‘Hindu hurt’ within British politics
and reconfigure the nature of political identities” (Mukta 2000: 442). In doing
this, Hindu organizations reference and deploy anti-Orientalist theories of the
colonial invention of caste (e.g., Dirks 2001, in NCHT-UK 2017: 16) that
help reframe the issue of social justice and equality in terms of the colonized
and the colonizer. The terms of the debate have been turned; it is no longer
about caste prejudice, but prejudice about caste. This shifts the target of atten-
tion away from Dalit experience itself toward Western or Christian ideology,
recalling how earlier threats to caste order were transmuted into threats to
Hindu religion abetted by missionaries in colonial South India.
If anti-discrimination legislation today is understood as an attack on a
Hindu religious minority, it is certainly conceived as an attack by Christians.
The prominence of Church figures, especially the former Anglican Bishop of
Oxford, Lord Harries, who supported introduction of the caste discrimination
provision into Parliament in 2010, not only affirms to Hindu organizations
the presence of a theological imagination behind the caste legislation, but
also allows discovery of a specific Christian purpose in it.
19 More recently, Shah (2017) questions these attempts to defend authentic ancient Hindu teach-
ing (e.g., on varna qualities) that have been corrupted into the modern “caste system” by colonial
rule. He dismisses such “constructivist” positions found, for example, in Dirks (2001) on caste, or
others on Hinduism (Sontheimer and Kulke 2001). Instead, drawing on the writing of S. N. Bala-
gangadhara (1994; 2012), he insists that both the caste system and Hinduism, its putative fount, are
fabrications of Protestant theological polemics, which inform us about Western culture and its con-
structions of India but tell us nothing about Indian or diaspora realities themselves (see Sutton
2018). The claim is that the caste system does not exist outside of the Western experience of
India, or its hegemonic projection as a “colonial consciousness” among present-day Indians
(Fárek et al. 2017).
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So, in a further enclosure of caste in religion, it was later claimed that
the ultimate purpose of the UK law relates not to caste at all, but instead to reli-
gious conversion. In this Hindu representation, the aim of having caste discrim-
ination recognized outside India and beyond Hinduism (among members of
any religion and in the UK’s legal system) is to bring pressure to bear on the
Indian government to extend its legal provisions for Scheduled Castes to the
presently excluded Christian and Muslim Dalits so as to remove an obstacle
to Dalit Christian conversion. The UK anti-discrimination legislation is thus por-
trayed as a threat to the (Hindu) religious exclusivity of caste in the service of
Christian proselytism, which is aimed, in turn, at increasing the Christian (demo-
graphic) presence in India to serve Western (UK and United States) geopolitical
interests and divide and weaken India (NCHT-UK 2017; Shah 2015). Church
involvement in international campaigns on Dalit rights—in reality an histor-
ical consequence of the fact that Dalits form the majority in the Indian
churches and continue to experience caste oppression—signals for Shah
“transnational activism for proselytism,” being the “key reason why caste
has emerged in the discourse of the Churches, Dalit organisations, and
Parliament” (2015: 83).20
The discursive transformation of caste into a matter of offended religious
sentiment, through exteriorization as the product of the malevolent schemes of
outsiders, is pretty much complete. The Hindu objection to UK public discus-
sion of caste in fact extends beyond the law and the “very hostile and deroga-
tory views about Hindus and Hindu faith” expressed in the House of Lords, to
coverage the caste question receives in other publicly funded fora, for example
the BBC, which received formal complaints concerning how the topic is con-
sidered, defined, and debated on the network.21 When a conference on caste,
inequality, and development for professionals, funders, and policy-makers
was organized through the SOAS South Asia Institute in September 2015, its
director received a letter from Prakash Shah as Co-Director of the Dharmic
Ideas Policy Foundation that objected to its critical stance on caste and
imputed a motive of proselytism to NGO co-organizers and SOAS’s associa-
tion with Christian-Orientalist UK caste legislation (through the EHRC
research).
The proposition that anti-caste-discrimination legislation in the UK is a
“continuing foreign interference in India’s internal affairs” (Shah 2015: 83)
is intriguing. The link to Indian reservations policy and proselytism is factually
groundless, but what is interesting is how the UK caste-law debate has
20 See Mosse (2012) on the relationship between mass protest against caste in the Catholic
Church and internationalized anti-caste Dalit activism.
21 British Hindu Voice complained to Lord Tony Hall (29 Sept. 2014) regarding a Nihal BBC
Asian Network program that discussed caste and the festival of Navaratri. See http://rajeev2004.
blogspot.com/2014/09/fwd-formal-complaint-bbc-asian-network.html (accessed 19 June 2018).
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produced platforms both on-line and off-line, for Indian Hindu nationalism and
its representatives. They provide the terms in which UK legislation is contested,
such as the Christian conversion threat, and through which a global Hindu iden-
tity is articulated, emboldened by the election of Narendra Modi, figured as a
leader of the global Hindu community—“a lion coming out to fight for San-
thana Dharmic values.” They are also giving this Hindu nationalist discourse
a presence in British politics.
Thus, in the run-up to the UK general election in May 2015, through
events such as a conference on “Dharma rising,”22 at which senior BJP MP
Subramanian Swamy was keynote speaker, there was appeal to Dharmic
voters to respond to the threat of caste legislation supported in the manifestos
of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, who, as one statement put it, “if
re-elected … would effectively introduce a Caste system here in the UK
(because that is what the [Bishop] Harries law is designed to initiate).”23
Public speeches realigned British Hindu political allegiances from long-term
support for Labour in places such as Leicester, to David Cameron’s Conserva-
tive party. The latter was now credited with building relationships with the
Modi government, strengthening business links with India, putting forward a
Gujarati Hindu candidate (and later a cabinet minister, Priti Patel), taking a
stand on Kashmir, and erecting a statue of Gandhi in Parliament Square, all
alongside the commitment to repeal the Hindu-denigrating legislation on
caste discrimination.24
The Dharma Sewa Purvapaksha (a forum for a common Hindu-Jain-Sikh
political voice) produced a flyer picturing the word “caste” branded on the fore-
heads of a mother and child above the headline, “Why Dharmic Voters need to
VOTE for a Conservative Govt.,” and implied that under Labour “every parent
and child living today and forever will be branded a casteist.”25 The direct
appeal to vote Conservative in the online open letter on the 3rd of May, four
days ahead of the election, crossed a line and put the Leicester-based National
Council of Hindu Temples into trouble with the Charity Commission. The
appeal was removed from the website.
22 British Board of Hindu Scholars (BBHS) conference, “Dharma Rising,” 4–6 Apr. 2015, in
London, West Midlands, and Slough. See http://www.nchtuk.org/index.php/8-news/latest-news/
407-dharma-rising-conference (accessed 10 July 2018).
23 Open letter from Satish K. Sharma, General Secretary, NCHT-UK, 3 May 2015. See Sam
Burne James, “Commission Assesses Hindu Charity’s Apparent Endorsement of the Conservative
Party,” Third Sector, 5 May 2015, https://www.thirdsector.co.uk/charity-commission-assesses-
hindu-charitys-apparent-endorsement-conservative-party/governance/article/1345819] (accessed
1 Sept. 2019).
24 E.g., Kapil Dudakia on “The Political Hindu,” Apr. 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=RDi2klJBITE (accessed 9 July 2018).
25 At http://pattniconnection.com/Events/DharmicCommunity-UKGenElection2015-GoldDust-
Votes.html (accessed 10 July 2018).
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The Hindu organizations’ response to an international mobilization of
Dalit rights activism on the law thus brought an Indian Hindu-nationalist dis-
course into UK politics, including the frankly eccentric imagination of UK anti-
caste discrimination legislation as being all about driving Indian reservations
policy and Christian religious conversion. Of course, articulating the issue of
UK caste legislation in the Hindu nationalist terms of Christian conversion
builds connections to powerful allies in India, whose invited voices have a
salience in British politics which will no doubt only increase post-Brexit.
The Internalization of Caste
The discursive enclosure of caste within Hinduism occurs through two moves:
the externalization just explained, but also an “internalization” that leaves caste
a matter internal to Hindu religion and forms of association. In this respect, the
EHRC study’s insistence that caste (as jati) was not a Hindu associational form
could not be entirely embraced. Let us turn, then, from the external representa-
tion of the legislation issue to reading its perceived internal effects.
For the sake of context, let me note that on the question of the impact
of the caste legislation the EHRC report concluded, “Many experts and
stakeholder groups saw [this] as having an overwhelmingly positive protective,
preventative and educative effect, as well as empowering those who today feel
discriminated and silenced. It was argued that anti-discrimination legislation
would reduce the taboo surrounding caste, reduce discrimination and help
bridge-building for community cohesion within Asian communities” (Dhanda,
Mosse, et al. 2014: vii).
Hindu organizations, however, regarded the legislation as producing
“untold harm to the associational and economic freedoms of … South Asian
communities.”26 They claimed the law would seek to ban such key group-
based religious events as the Navratri festival on the grounds of alleged caste
discrimination, generate prejudice against South Asian employers, require
the monitoring of caste (as a protected characteristic), or unleash vexatious
caste discrimination cases. Shah (2015) details the case against the law.
I cannot discuss these concerns here (see Waughray 2016), but all were even-
tualities considered, reviewed, and debated in the EHRC work on how the law
that Parliament had already passed should be implemented, without being
regarded as insurmountable obstacles. What I want to suggest here is that to
make sense of the Hindu organizations’ objections requires understanding
that they arise from a social project of an altogether different kind from that
of Dalit organizations. That is to say, first, that it is not about caste discrimina-
tion per se, but rather about identity formation and, in particular, protecting the
space for a religious identity, as British Hindus or now Dharmic religionists
26 Dharmic Ideas and Policy Foundation, https://dharmicideas.wordpress.com.
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(rather than British Asians). This is itself a product of the importance of religion
as a “mediating discourse for state institutions” (Zavos 2015: 1) in the
multi-ethnic UK, with its shifting mix of concerns about multiculturalism, com-
munity cohesion, and religious militancy (Knott 2009). Second, the objections
represent a contest not only over law but also over the categories of description
that social science offers to law and their perceived effects.
The notion of “caste” in public discussion and law seems potentially
disruptive of the Hindu social project of identity-making.27 If, as John Zavos
suggests, diaspora identity involves “identifications outside the national time/
space in order to live inside, with a difference” (2015, citing Clifford 1997:
251) then the characterization of that difference is crucial. The assertion of pos-
itive Hindu identity requires elimination of negative ascriptions, including
caste, especially where caste already exists as a critical representation of Hin-
duism itself, and is also internally dividing, politically disruptive, and the very
opposite of the kind of civic virtue British Hindus seek to promote through
ideas such as socially responsible service (sewa), which Zavos (2015) sees
folded into Big Society themes through which Hindus become model citizens
in UK society.
But if caste and any link with Hindus is best forgotten, why mobilize so
publicly and noisily on the caste question as Hindus? This suggests a different
kind of argument—also from the diaspora literature—namely that public asser-
tions of a unified Hindu tradition (expanded to a Dharmic community) are
important or become so precisely because of the continuing significance of dif-
ferentiated caste (named as jati) identities “as an indispensable part of the asso-
ciational life of Indians in the United Kingdom” (Shah 2015: 77). In this view,
caste is vital to family status, marriage, community leadership, temple organi-
zation, voluntary organizations, and business and other networks. Especially so
among Hindu migrants from East Africa where, according to Vertovec, corpo-
rate caste groups had crystalized as associations for purposes of liaising with
government authorities, as against, for instance, those from Trinidad, with its
history of indentured labor that eroded caste (2000: 25–26; Zavos 2012).
But in the different circumstance of Britain, where religion provides the
privileged means for public identity negotiation, the development of an
ecumenical composite “British Hindu” community requires that caste/jati
networking, while of continuing importance, is protected as an “inner”
domain (in Chatterjee’s [1993] terms) to which entry is guarded and which
cannot be exposed to outsider regulation through legislation, for fear that, as
the City Hindus Network put it at a 2013 event, “Community organisations—
jati/gnati based groups—such as those many of us have been exposed to since
27 Paradoxically, the mobilization against legislative recognition of caste-divided Asian identity
served to differentiate Hindu from “Asian” identity, through epithets such as “my caste is Hindu”
(mycasteishindu.org).
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a young age may well find themselves acting illegally.”28 The anxiety thus
comes as some are led to wonder whether it will always be possible for caste
affiliation to be distinguished from caste discrimination, and as the language
of law turns on the ambiguous boundary between the inner-private and the
outer-public. Some Hindus would want to “hold on to the identity-conferring
role of caste, but deny that it could work in law as an identifiable basis of dis-
crimination” (Dhanda 2015: 40). Meanwhile, for those (of any caste but in this
polarized debate, primarily the Dalits) potentially subject to discrimination or
the exclusions and stigmatizing effects of invisible caste networks, the law
allows recognition and redress.
The strength of feeling in this debate arises from the “constitutive” capac-
ity of law—its ability to construct categories and shape self-conceptions. It is
seen to be about how people make their own identities and those of others
(as bearers of rights), including in the eye of the state (Merry 2012: 105).
Law is expected to have an educational role but is also given an ideological
role. It offers a public articulation of the social that some regard as restricting
freedoms and others as enhancing them.
The proposed law was unable to inscribe particular identities (the naming
of castes is no part of it29), and its purpose was to address discrimination and
not to criminalize or remove caste. But it would have allowed an aspect of
“community” hitherto of the “inner domain,” reproduced while remaining
invisible to the public eye, to become subject to public discussion, claims,
and cases. The “looping” (Hacking 1996) social effects of the social science
idea of caste (or the cultural stereotype, as Hindu organizations fear) being
drawn into law and its cases is unknown. It would certainly be channeled by
the social divides articulated, in anticipation, by the present controversy. But
the question here is not so much about how law shapes social identities but
who controls the legal sensibility that will be deployed in matters of caste in
the UK. If caste as a set of ideas and practices is open to the law as a “distinct
way of imagining the real” (Geertz 1983: 184), it falls to influences beyond the
control of particular groups. Placing the caste idea in public is either an incur-
sion into inner community spaces30 or, for those suffering invisible judgements
about their worth, it is the “outing” of prejudice offering the guarantee of pro-
tection under law (as Ambedkar understood). The government’s July 2018
decision to repeal its duty to include caste in UK equality law, on the
grounds that this “risked promoting, creating or entrenching ideas of caste or
heightening caste consciousness” (Government Equality Office 2018: 5),
28 At www.cityhinusnetwork.org.uk/caste-legislation-event (accessed 19 Apr. 2015).
29 The only legally-relevant caste identity is that deduced by a court as having been held by a
perpetrator of caste discrimination regarding the identity of the victim.
30 The further claim of Hindu organizations is that the law on caste embeds Christian theology,
and that its judgements would be shaped by the stereotyping presumption “that Indians, and Hindus
specifically, discriminate on grounds of caste” (Shah 2015: 73).
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bends toward the protection of upper-caste community spaces and away from
those seeking protection from discrimination.
The effects of the new legislation and the degree of litigiousness around
caste was always unknown (although suspected to be limited). This has been
a meta-contest about who can allow or disallow the language of caste itself
(Merry 2012: 105) at critical junctures, and derivatively about the categories
of description, interpretation, and explanation of the social. These are epistemo-
logical struggles between claims and counterclaims to knowledge, and about
being known or unknown.
As such, they are also a public engagement with social science, especially
anthropology, as a generalizing discourse that makes the social available for
public debate and for law; an engagement that places social groups in a very
different relationship to that social science, which is in turn affected. Hindu
organizations aim to detach their sociality and associations from anthropology
and its category of caste, except where provincialized as a Western colonial or
theological notion that is unintelligible to the society to which it is applied
(Shah 2015: 24). By contrast, Dalits, in their struggle for justice, place their
experiences in the hands of ever-more-generalizing frameworks: of caste,
Christian or Buddhist social ethics, law, and human rights. As one would
expect, these contentions have already changed the public discourse and mean-
ings of caste in the UK.
In the simplest terms, we have here a historically-anticipated contest
between claims to freedom from caste discrimination and claims to the
freedom of caste association in the name of religion. This is linked internation-
ally with the struggle for global freedom from caste versus the freedom of the
Indian nation to resolve the question of caste as an internal matter, unique both
in form and solution to India, as a postcolonial nation, and its social policy. In
this regard, the Indian government has made stringent efforts, especially since
the 1990s, to ensure that the issue and language of caste or caste-based discrim-
ination does not enter the agenda of United Nations treaty bodies,31 and that
India does not have monitored accountability to the UN for its record on
caste inequality and discrimination (see Waughray 2010). In March 2016, a
report on caste-based discrimination by the UN Human Rights Council
Special Rapporteur (SR) on minority issues (Izsák-Ndiaye 2016) was objected
to by the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva as “in breach of
the SR mandate,” caste not being covered under issues of minorities—that is
national, ethnic or religious minorities—even though Dalits, taking their cue
from Ambedkar’s historical struggle, were self-identifying as such (Mitra
2016; Waughray 2010). This is only the most recent of a series of stand-offs
31 For example, caste as a form of discrimination based on “descent” under the International
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (Waughray
2010: 335–36).
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following repeated efforts by Dalit and human rights organizations to interna-
tionalize the issue of caste in the legal language of race, descent, and human
rights, most notably tabling the issue of caste discrimination at the 2001
World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban. These efforts have
consistently been blocked by official representatives of the Indian government,
who refused to agree to amendments that would allow caste to fall officially
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (Waughray and Keane 2017).
In sum, it is clear that the interlinked resistance to the language of caste
in international law or in other jurisdictions such as the UK by the Indian
government or Hindu organizations is a response to transnational campaigns on
caste and Dalit rights that de-enclose or universalize caste. These efforts to domes-
ticate caste parallel the enclosure of caste within Hinduism in the response to
Ambedkar’s movement in the 1930s, in the Indian policy erasure of caste outside
Hinduism, and as a response to the introduction of caste into UK equality law.
C OM P E T I N G C A S T E L E S S N E S S I N C O N T EM P O RA RY I N D I A
I come now to a third and final set of claims to live “outside caste,” which char-
acterize the contemporary social life of caste in India. Claims to castelessness
differ radically with social position, between upper-caste and Dalit. Today, the
idea that caste is misconstrued as having to do with inequality, injustice, and
discrimination, and need not (or no longer need) be regulated by law, is
common among India’s privileged castes and middle classes (e.g., Subrama-
nian 2015). There is a rising tide of opinion against the policy of affirmative
action “reservations” for lower castes in public sector employment and
higher education, voiced in the name of merit, modernity, and market-led
development. Thorat, Naik, and Tagade (2016) point out that the arguments
against reservations on such grounds as poor outcomes, “creamy-layer” bene-
fits, or inefficiency are simply not supported empirically, and a swell of recent
economics research (reviewed in Mosse 2018a) clearly refutes the notion that
affirmative action is no longer necessary because unequal opportunity and
market-based discrimination are things of the past.
In India, the privileged critics of reservations do not usually denounced
caste itself as colonialist theology, but they do understand it as having been
transformed by forces of economic mobility and democracy, so that what
remains of caste is benign or beneficial. Caste, as Balmurli Natrajan (2012)
explains, is portrayed as a valued social asset or cultural identity, as part of
the vitality of Indian democracy, or as providing networks of trust for business.
In any case, caste is seen as a private family matter that should not be the
subject of public policy and reported caste atrocities are identified as brutal
abnormalities of normally benign caste (ibid.). Caste is stripped of its relation-
ality, and therefore of the character of inequality or discrimination. Caste is
enclosed, or internalized, as cultural belonging, apart from economy and
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society. In parallel, “castelessness” (the personal irrelevance of caste to all inter-
actions) becomes an upper-caste subjectivity (Subramanian 2015: 295–96). But
this “castelessness” is increasingly subject to critical appraisal as a power-
effect, as cloaking upper-caste privilege and delegating, or exteriorizing,
caste as a subaltern as much as a colonial formation. Dalits specifically are
accused of being its purveyors (ibid.; Deshpande 2013: 32–36).
While scholars such as Andre Béteille, and Fuller and Narasimhan, whose
book on Tamil Brahmans quotes him, say, “Caste has ceased to play an active
part in the reproduction of inequality, at least at the upper levels of the social
hierarchy” (2014: 121–22). It would be more accurate to say that caste only
ceases to matter (with opportunity arising from individual merit) if one
discounts all the class- and caste-based cultural capital, the networks, and
language that people need to get to the point where caste does not count. It
is unsurprising that those who benefit from opportunity-hoarding, the operation
of “prejudicial norms” related to stereotyped (and perhaps feared) out-groups
(Thorat, Naik, and Tagade 2016), and the “privileged capacity,” as Deshpande
(2013: 32) puts it, to translate accumulated “caste capital” into “modern
capital” (property, higher qualifications, professions, etc.) would want the
work of caste to be accomplished unnoticed, hidden behind self-fashioned
fronts of casteless merit, modernity, and middle-classness.
Because of the way reservations policy works, Deshpande (2013: 36)
points out, upper castes are guaranteed anonymity in preserving privilege
born of caste, “encashed” as casteless merit. They can lay claim to private or
public resources as unmarked citizens, without having to actually abandon
caste. Meanwhile, lower castes become “hyper-visible” in their claims.
Given that Dalits can only mobilize for rights or resources or justice by
using caste politically (firmly identifying them with their caste), “castelessness”
can be deployed against them in elite-dominated domains (ibid.: 32, 36).
As Subramanian (2015: 293) notes, these processes are relational. That is
to say, upper-caste claims to middle-class meritocracy can be threatened by
lower-caste political assertions that might expose the caste privilege behind
“merit,” undercutting general cultural, religious, or class identities by exposing
caste. Threats to the caste-invisibility of privilege provoke resistance, as in, for
example, the violent reaction to the extension of reservations to a broad
category of the Other Backward Classes in the 1990s, which, Deshpande
(2013: 38) argues, exposed the “general category” as essentially upper-caste,
or as seen in the push-back against the reintroduction of caste enumeration
into the national census in 2011 (Vithayathil 2018). And I have explained
the response to the introduction of caste into UK equality law in terms of the
threat to expose caste to public scrutiny and “brand” cosmopolitan Hindus
with the caste label, while damaging their “incorporated” image in the UK
“market of identities” (see Subramanian 2015: 314). At least in the UK, as
Zavos puts it, “Hindu identity develops … through dialogue with other
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diasporic identities” (2015: 2). At this juncture, the Dalit caste discrimination
legislation movement is the “opposition” against which the Hindu (or
Dharmic) community has sought institutional cohesiveness and new public
articulation of its identity and political position.
Dalit Aspirations to Castelessness
I have given much attention to the perspective of caste-privileged groups, their
enclosures of caste and claims to castelessness. In conclusion, I want to turn
attention to contemporary attitudes to caste among Dalits, beginning with
those expressed in an opinion survey of 204 individuals across age, gender,
class, caste (Pallar, Paraiyar), and religion (Hindu and Christian) and covering
issues of caste identity and relationships. It was carried out between 2005 and
2011 by my collaborator and Dalit resident of Alapuram village, M. Sivan,
alongside my own fieldwork in two village sites of long-term research, in the
southern Tamil district of Sivagangai. I also draw here on interviews recorded
in the same communities by Jesuit Dalit activist Selvaraj Arulnathan, as part of
a collaborative project (see Mosse 2018b).
The denial of caste among the privileged can be set against what appears,
at least in a Dalit community that I am somewhat familiar with, to be an
emerging aspiration to “castelessness” of a different kind. This is more akin
to Dr Ambedkar’s “annihilation of caste” and his idea of fraternity grounded
in common humanity and, as he put it, the transformation of the “social
conscience” (Rodrigues 2002: 122, 525).
I can only briefly summarize some key findings on the views and aspirations
expressed by people across age, gender, or religious affiliation as Hindus, Catho-
lics, Protestants, or Pentecostals (for details, see Mosse 2018b: 276–87). One
finding is that these Dalits place the life of slavery, untouchability, and humiliation
in the past and that civility and equality of treatment are on the rise. From earlier
work in this locality I was aware of two socially distinguished kinds of response to
historical and present caste subordination. The first was framed by a Dalit dis-
course of honor aimed at challenging exclusion and subordination in relation to
public space, land, education, and religion, including within the Catholic
Church. Another was aimed at inner transformation and a break with an untouch-
able past through forms of cultural reevaluation, re-mythologizing (including
through Christian imagination), and the reshaping of service roles (Mosse 2012:
168–86). What seems clear is that there has been a marked weakening of the dis-
course of honor in tandem with socio-economic changes and the legally backed
prohibition on practices of caste discrimination, or exclusion from public spaces
such as streets, shops, tanks, and temples, as well as the Catholic Church.
Instead of emphasizing the struggle for status and against upper-caste dom-
ination across the board, people stress change, which they characterize as a
process of “civilization” or a growth in civility (nākarīkam), and the leaving
behind of a time of degradation and disgust (acin˙kam). “Civilization” here can
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allude to public forms of respect, standing in line, work undertaken for negotiated
rates, and roles and services reframed in the idiom of the market. A disjuncture is
imagined between today and the era of slavery (aṭimai) and untouchability
(tīṇṭāmai). Christianity can be aligned with these changes without being their
cause, and most did not credit the churches with changing caste practices.
The second overarching finding is that, although Dalits by and large in this
way believed they were living in a changed world, without extreme caste
inequality, and though they clearly expected equal treatment from modern insti-
tutions like schools and colleges, civility was not felt to be assured. Freedom
from caste was uncertain. There were several reasons for this. For one thing,
caste prejudice is suspected but is indiscernible; it exists unseen as a state of
mind or a mental attitude and requires an attentive negotiation of social life
to avoid humiliation. Likewise, Suryakant Waghmore (2018) describes a
“Hindu politeness” in rural Maharashtra that might accompany “hidden
disgust” and that could be withdrawn at any time to expose Dalits to violence.
For another thing, poverty exposes people to caste prejudice and humiliation,
just as civility and social respect bend toward money and power.
Third, although less visible in social interaction, caste is pervasive in its
effects. Probing into the experiences of searching for work, education, or busi-
ness opportunities reveals lives constrained in new ways by caste, reworked as
the private connections and cultural capital necessary to secure jobs or other
things (Mosse n.d.). Alongside assertions that things had changed, 82
percent of those asked felt caste remained an obstacle or barrier (tatai) to
their family’s advancement.
Fourth and finally, “inferiorized” identity is inescapable. A majority of
those surveyed expected, as Dalits, to experience ill-treatment and disrespect,
and could not imagine escape into casteless anonymity in rural society. Signifi-
cantly, it was the poorest and women who were most led by experiences of ill
treatment to try to conceal their caste, often when laboring in distant places. For
example, Lily, a thirty-two-year-old Christian Dalit [Paraiyar], explains, “When
we went to Chennai for bricks work, near where we worked there were cēri
houses [ce ̄ri meaning here both slum and Dalit “colony”]. The upper-caste
people were speaking about them as inferior, so we said we were Gounders
[non-Dalits]” (survey, Alapuram, Aug. 2005).
But Dalits also spoke of their fear of being discovered, and in some cases
they gave this as a reason not to undertake migrant labor repeatedly for the
same employers. Sixty-year-old Krishnan recalls: “We went to a village for
rice harvesting, beyond Devakottai. We were working for a Kallar-caste
house and hiding our caste; we did not say Paraiyar, we said we were
cēṉiyār [weaver] people. They thought we were upper-caste people. They
treated us well and gave us meals inside the house, and we were sleeping
inside the house. For two harvests we went to work there. After that we
didn’t go again, afraid that they would come to know our caste” (ibid.).
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Many of those interviewed blamed the state for making caste inescapable for
Dalits, since all have to declare “SC” status (and Hindu identity) as the condi-
tion of state support. As Catholic Dalit Arulraj said, “As soon as we are born we
are baptized and at the same time the caste is written.”32
Expectations of a civility that cannot be had in face of experiences indel-
ibly marked by caste and its harder-to-see effects produce not expressions of
renewed struggle for Dalit honor (as they once did), but instead the reassertion
of an ideology of casteless humanity, summed up in the aphorism, “We are
human beings with one blood.” The persisting power of hidden caste in
shaping opportunities is met with three denials: ontological denial (caste has
no truth, it is a human fabrication); temporal denial (caste is past, erased by
modernity and civility); and social denial (the aspiration to castelessness).
This represents a Dalit response to caste that is quite at odds with both Dalit
activist assertions in the discourse of honor and Dipankar Gupta’s (2005)
and others’ idea that identity is more important than hierarchy in modern
caste politics, since it is the persistence of caste power and inequality (not to
mention exposure to violence and humiliation) that removes value from iden-
tities of caste that nonetheless remain inescapable.33
The commitment to castelessness amidst the pervasive, unexpressed expe-
rience of caste determining one’s life-chances is something even more evident
in urban Dalit communities. Roberts explains this in his ethnographic account
of Pentecostalism in the Chennai slum of Anbu Nagar (2016). Pentecostals
there push castelessness further, and do not see themselves as Dalits in relation
to upper castes, but rather as those with true humanity. Despite caste being
central to their daily experience, it is erased from Pentecostals’ accounts of
themselves. Roberts infers that this is because of the shame and hurt of
untouchability that shadow Dalits’ flight from untouchability in the village to
“mere poverty” in the city. When Anbu Nagar Pentecostals say they are caste-
less, they are saying, like Alapuram Dalits, that caste holds no truth. But they
go further, as does Ambedkar, by insisting that caste is nothing but the denial of
humanity by hoarding caste others, and that it is unique to India. Slum dwellers
with shared poverty and humanity imagine themselves as humanitarian outsid-
ers, caring and worthy of being cared for—trapped within uncaring caste India.
This notion of India as a negative moral space involves a distinctive valuing of
the non-Indian foreign, imagined (unrealistically it has to be said) as places and
peoples of true humanity and home to loving allies. This image creates for them
a corresponding “foreignness of belonging” that is found also in the utterly
32 Commonly, Christian Dalits register as Scheduled Castes by officially recording Hindu iden-
tities and names.
33 It is, of course, well known that Dalits hold a moral position of casteless humanity, located by
today’s intellectuals and leaders in various caste-evading religious and political ideologies, includ-
ing identification of “Tamil” as an authentic casteless identity (see Thirumavalavan 2011). Here I
am pointing to a specific change in a local Dalit discourse on caste.
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foreign divinity and hope beyond experience, and beyond words as in Pente-
costal glossolalia. This is the precise inverse of the Hindu nationalist discourse
on Christian conversion as cultural alienation and moral threat.
The Dalit aspiration to casteless humanity takes us to Dr Ambedkar’s final
stance: his conversion to Buddhism, not to worship different gods, or indeed
any god, but as an embrace of the idea of humanity beyond the social order
(Vajpeyi 2014). And as anthropologists of India, it takes us to M. N. Srinivas’s
emphasis on the importance of attending both to the changing nature of rela-
tions of caste, and to the distinctive terms, or discourses, through which
these are represented, whether varna, Sanskritization, or now, varied forms
of castelessness and claims to live “outside caste.”
C O N C L U S I O N
Caste has always generated political and scholarly controversy, but the forms
that this takes today newly combine anti-caste activism with counter-claims
about the irrelevance or non-existence of caste or claims to castelessness that
are, in turn, viewed as the new disguise of caste power and privilege. In dia-
spora settings, caste is erased within an “economy of offense” in which “hurt
religious sentiments” are a privilege limited to the elite (Viswanath 2016).
These contentions revisit and replay older moves to enclose caste within Hin-
duism and the nation so as to restrict the field of social policy and law, and the
contradictory figure of the Dalit Christian convert reappears as a target for ideo-
logical projections. Caste society divides between those able to sustain claims
to live outside caste, which both disappears as an “inner domain” and is exte-
riorized to others such as its colonial inventors or subaltern purveyors, and
those inescapably marked by their caste and the judgements it brings. These dis-
putes around caste are about how “the social” is made available for public debate
and especially for the law; they concern the categories of description and analy-
sis. Postcolonial and anti-Orientalist scholarship becomes a resource in the denial
of claims about caste (as an object) and its discriminatory effects, just as scholarly
discourses on caste, race, or human rights are deployed in the support of such
claims. As Dalits and upper castes enter epistemological debates over categories
of description on opposite sides, they engage with anthropology, whose subject
of enquiry—the social world—it is increasingly clear, is no longer independent
or unaltered by its terms of description and debate.
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Abstract: Caste has always generated political and scholarly controversy, but the
forms that this takes today newly combine anti-caste activism with counter-claims
that caste is irrelevant or non-existent, or claims to castelessness. Claims to caste-
lessness are, in turn, viewed by some as a new disguise for caste power and priv-
ilege, while castlessness is also an aspiration for people subject to caste-based
discrimination. This article looks at elite claims to “enclose” caste within religion,
specifically Hinduism, and the Indian nation so as to restrict the field of social
policy that caste applies to, to exempt caste-based discrimination from the law,
and to limit the social politics of caste. It does so through a comparative analysis
of two cases. The first is the exclusion of Christian and Muslim Dalits—members
of castes subordinated as “untouchable”—from provisions and protections as
Scheduled Castes in India. The other case is that of responses to the introduction
of caste into anti-discrimination law in the UK. While Hindu organizations in the
UK reject “caste” as a colonial and racist term and deploy postcolonial scholar-
ship to deny caste discrimination, Dalit organizations, representing its potential
victims, turn to scholarly discourse on caste, race, or human rights to support
their cause. These are epistemological disputes about categories of description
and how “the social” is made available for public debate, and especially for
law. Such disputes engage with anthropology, whose analytical terms animate
and change the social world that is their subject.
Key words: caste, religion, Hinduism, India, UK equality law, Dalit activism,
anthropology
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